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THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR INMATE
GENDER CONFIRMATION SURGERY
Bryce Couch*

ABSTRACT
Transgender refers to “people whose gender identity, gender expression,
or behavior does not conform to what is socioculturally accepted as, and
typically associated with, the legal and medical sex to which they were assigned at birth.” Despite representing a small percentage of the U.S. population (0.58%), the transgender community is disproportionately
represented in the prison system. Studies suggest that one-in-six transgender people (16%) have been incarcerated in their lifetime, compared to
2.8%–6.6% of the general U.S. population. In total, transgender individuals comprise 0.24% of the U.S. prison and jail population.
Unfortunately, research indicates that the prison system is “ill-prepared
to accommodate the needs of transgender inmates.” This is especially problematic because the transgender population presents particularized medical
needs. For example, gender dysphoria generally describes discomfort or
distress resulting from the incongruence between a person’s gender identity
and sex assigned at birth. For some, however, the distress associated with
gender dysphoria may necessitate a formal diagnosis. In these cases, an
individual not only exhibits marked incongruence between gender and sex
but also “clinically significant distress or impairment” in social, school or
occupational, or other important areas of functioning. A formal diagnosis
of gender dysphoria facilitates access to necessary gender-affirming care,
including hormone therapy and gender confirmation surgery. Failure to
provide necessary medical treatment for gender dysphoria can result in depression, suicidality, autocastration, and death.
Although the Eighth Amendment imposes an affirmative duty on prison
officials to provide adequate medical care to inmates, the U.S. courts of
appeals asymmetrically valorize this constitutional right in the context of
gender-affirming care. This Comment argues that transgender inmates
presenting gender dysphoria possess a serious medical need that poses a
substantial risk of harm. A failure to provide, or a categorical prohibition
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2022; B.S.F.S., Georgetown
University, May 2019. The author would like to thank his family for their constant support
and encouragement, especially his sister, DaNae, for her eagerness to discuss the law. Additionally, thank you to the incredible staff of the SMU Law Review Association for the
hard work and dedication throughout this process. Finally, the author has immense gratitude and respect for the advocacy groups that continue to defend the rights of LGBTQIA+
individuals, especially those living within the U.S. prison system.
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of, necessary forms of gender-affirming care runs afoul of the Eighth
Amendment’s guarantee of adequate care. Ultimately, this Comment evaluates the Estelle-Farmer framework—formed by two U.S. Supreme Court
opinions that bear on the issue—and proposes an objective inquiry into the
medical necessity of a particular form of treatment and a per se rule regarding deliberate indifference. In doing so, this Comment advocates for
greater protection of the constitutional rights of transgender inmates and
addresses several arguments advanced by opponents of gender-affirming
care.
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I. INTRODUCTION

O

N September 29, 2015, Adree Edmo, an inmate in the Idaho Department of Correction, composed a note: “I do not want to
die,” she wrote, “but I am a woman, and women do not have
these.”1 She left the note in her prison cell, opened a disposable razor,
and disinfected it.2 With the razor, Edmo carefully sliced into her right
testicle.3 This was Edmo’s first—but not last—attempt at autocastration.4
Edmo’s story is indicative of a troubling reality. While the transgender
population is disproportionately represented in the U.S. prison system,
prison officials are often ill-prepared to address transgender needs, including housing, clothing, and—most significantly—medical care.5 The
prison system’s unpreparedness to adequately care for the transgender
population can lead to particularly dangerous outcomes—especially for
those, like Edmo, presenting symptoms of gender dysphoria.
Sexual minorities are more likely to be incarcerated, relative to the
general population.6 According to a 2016 study conducted by the Williams Institute, approximately 1.4 million, or 0.58%, of adults in the
United States identify as transgender.7 Although transgender people represent a small percentage of the U.S. population, studies suggest that
nearly one-in-six transgender people (16%) have been incarcerated.8
Evaluated using an intersectional lens, this statistic is even more troubling: 21% of transgender women and 47% of Black transgender people
have been incarcerated.9 By contrast, only an estimated 2.8%–6.6% “of
1. Amanda Peacher & Lacey Daley, Episode 1: “I’m Not a Monster Like Most People
Think,” BOISE STATE PUB. RADIO, at 0:00–1:00 (July 8, 2019), https://
www.boisestatepublicradio.org/post/episode-1-im-not-monster-most-people-think [https://
perma.cc/JQR7-4Y5U].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See generally Douglas Routh, Gassan Abess, David Makin, Mary K. Stohr, Craig
Hemmens & Jihye Yoo, Transgender Inmates in Prisons: A Review of Applicable Statutes
and Policies, 61 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPAR. CRIMINOLOGY (2015).
6. Ilan H. Meyer, Andrew R. Flores, Lara Stemple, Adam P. Romero, Bianca D.M.
Wilson & Jody L. Herman, Incarceration Rates and Traits of Sexual Minorities in the United
States: National Inmate Survey, 2011–2012, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 267, 272 (2017).
7. ANDREW R. FLORES, JODY L. HERMAN, GARY J. GATES & TAYLOR N.T. BROWN,
WILLIAMS INST., HOW MANY ADULTS IDENTIFY AS TRANSGENDER IN THE UNITED
STATES? 3 (June 2016), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/TransAdults-US-Aug-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/SBE8-UJH7].
8. NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., BLUEPRINT FOR EQUALITY: A TRANSGENDER FEDERAL AGENDA FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 51 (Oct. 2016), https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/
NCTE%20Federal%20Blueprint%202016%20web_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ARF7-8YDN].
9. Id.; see also NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., A BLUEPRINT FOR EQUALITY: PRISON AND DETENTION REFORM 1 (2012), https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/
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the general U.S. population” have been incarcerated in their lifetime.10
Unfortunately, there are minimal, and often outdated, data on the exact population size of sexual minorities currently in the U.S. prison system.11 For example, the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) conducts the
National Inmate Survey (NIS) to collect “data on the incidence and prevalence of sexual assault in correctional facilities” pursuant to the Prison
Rape Elimination Act of 2003.12 The BJS data from the 2011–2012 NIS-3
survey estimated that there were 3,209 transgender inmates in state and
federal prisons,13 as well as an additional 1,709 inmates in local jails.14 A
2020 study conducted by NBC News determined that states and the District of Columbia house 4,890 transgender inmates.15 Relying on the BJS
data, the Williams Institute estimated in 2016 that transgender people
comprise 0.24% of the U.S. prison and jail population.16
At the same time, extensive research documents the victimization of
transgender people in the U.S. prison system.17 For example, studies
show a “heightened prevalence of . . . severe verbal harassment, purposeful humiliation, physical assault and beatings, unwanted sexual
touching, unwarranted strip searches and pat-downs, and forcible penetrative sex from other inmates and custody staff.”18 Beyond this, transgender inmates struggle to secure the housing, clothing, and medical care
that align with their particular gender identities.19
The purpose of this Comment is threefold: (1) to educate readers regarding the transgender population, the importance of gender-affirming
care, and the systemic barriers that prevent access to appropriate medical
care within correctional facilities; (2) to demonstrate how the Eighth
Amendment constitutionalizes an inmate’s right to adequate health care,
files/docs/resources/NCTE_Blueprint_for_Equality2012_Prison_Reform.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZGN2-JHCP].
10. Kirsty A. Clark, Jaclyn M. White Hughto & John E. Pachankis, “What’s the Right
Thing to Do?” Correctional Healthcare Providers’ Knowledge, Attitudes and Experiences
Caring for Transgender Inmates, 193 SOC. SCI. & MED. 80, 80 (2017).
11. Meyer et al., supra note 6, at 267.
12. National Inmate Surgery (NIS), OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS (May 26, 2009), https://
www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=278 [https://perma.cc/U3UL-3HSR].
13. Letter from Lambda Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. et al. to U.S. Comm’n on C.R.
(Mar. 25, 2019), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20190402/109200/HHRG-116JU00-20190402-SD018.pdf [https://perma.cc/UX74-59XC].
14. OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS
AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2011–12 (Dec. 2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/svpjri1112_st.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SHU-WHAK].
15. Kate Sosin, Trans, Imprisoned—and Trapped, NBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2020), https://
www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/transgender-women-are-nearly-always-incarceratedmen-s-putting-many-n1142436 [https://perma.cc/Q85P-PMQH].
16. Jody L. Herman, Taylor N.T. Brown, Bianca D.M. Wilson, Ilan H. Meyer & Andrew R. Flores, Prevalence, Characteristics, and Sexual Victimization of Incarcerated Transgender People in the United States: Results from the National Inmate Survey (NIS-3),
WILLIAMS INST. (2016), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Trans-Incarceration-Violence-Oct-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KSS-UU7N].
17. Clark et al., supra note 10, at 80–81.
18. Id.
19. See generally Routh et al., supra note 5, at 19 (demonstrating the failure of state
correctional facilities to provide basic necessities for transgender inmates).
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and how the existing Estelle-Farmer framework has failed to secure adequate care for transgender inmates presenting gender dysphoria; and (3)
to argue in favor of a reconceptualized test that protects the right to gender-confirmation surgery for gender dysphoric inmates.
To do this, Part II educates readers on key terminology pertaining to
gender and sex in the transgender population. It then details the treatment of the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) population
by the medical community, focusing on the de-pathologization of sexual
minorities. Finally, the Section explores medical needs specific to the
transgender community, focusing on gender dysphoria as a pathway to
specific treatment.
Part III demonstrates that the Eighth Amendment constitutionalizes
the right to inmate health care. This Comment will explore the origins of
the Eighth Amendment and the shift towards the evolving standards of
decency. Part IV argues that the Estelle-Farmer framework—in the context of gender dysphoric inmates—is an unworkable standard that has not
consistently protected the rights of transgender inmates. Consequently,
the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits utilize differing approaches to gender
confirmation surgery. Part V reconceptualizes the test, showing that: (1)
gender dysphoria is a serious medical need; (2) gender confirmation surgery is a medically necessary form of treatment for gender dysphoria; and
(3) categorical prohibition against gender-affirming care is per se deliberate indifference. Finally, Part VI addresses common counterarguments to
the provision of gender-affirming care to inmates.
II. TRANSGENDER: A MATTER OF DIVERSITY, NOT
PATHOLOGY
This Section provides necessary background on de-pathologization of
the transgender community. Specifically, it highlights that a subset of the
transgender community may exhibit clinically significant gender
dysphoria that serves as a pathway to necessary forms of gender-affirming care.
A. RELEVANT TERMINOLOGY
To better understand the transgender community, it is important to distinguish between some commonly misunderstood terms. Transgender refers to “people whose gender identity, gender expression, or behavior
does not conform to what is socioculturally accepted as, and typically associated with, the legal and medical sex to which they were assigned at
birth.”20 Although “sex” and “gender” are often used interchangeably,
the distinction between the two is critical. For the purposes of this Comment, sex refers to the physical and biological traits that typically catego20. Daphna Stroumsa, The State of Transgender Health Care: Policy, Law, and Medical Frameworks, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH e31, e31 (2014).
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rize individuals as male, female, or intersex.21 On the other hand, gender
refers to the psychological, behavioral, social, and cultural aspects of being male or female.22 Gender identity23 refers to an individual’s personal
identification as male, female, both, or neither, and gender expression refers to an individual’s presentation and behavior—including physical appearance, clothing, etc.—as it relates to socially constructed views of
gender or gender roles.24 Accordingly, “[g]ender nonconformity refers
[generally] to the extent to which a person’s gender identity, role, or expression differs from the cultural norms prescribed for people of a particular sex.”25
B. TRANSGENDER HEALTH CARE: FROM PATHOLOGY

TO

DIVERSITY

Psychiatric, psychological, and other medical professionals historically
sought to “cure” the LGBT community.26 Treatment of LGBT persons
by medical professionals is a relatively recent invention that coincided
with “the conceptualization of homosexuality as a medical-psychological
phenomenon.”27 Although “the American Psychiatric Association (APA)
removed the diagnosis of ‘homosexuality’” in 1973,28 historically, to be
transgender has practically meant the continued medicalization or disordering by various medical and psychological organizations.29 In 1980, the
APA classified gender identity disorder (GID) as a formal diagnosis in
the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-3).30 A diagnosis for GID remained an official category until
the APA published the DSM-5 in 2013.31 This shift came after a December 2012 decision by the APA to de-pathologize gender variance.32 Thus,
today, to be transgender is a “[m]atter of [d]iversity, [n]ot [p]athology.”33
Despite significant changes in the treatment of transgender people in
the late-twentieth century, necessary “[h]ealth care [for the transgender
21. AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, DEFINITIONS RELATED TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION & GENDER
DIVERSITY IN APA DOCUMENTS 5 (2015), https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/sexualitydefinitions.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL56-JK7V].
22. Id. at 2.
23. Id. at 4.
24. Id. at 3–4.
25. Eli Coleman et al., Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender,
and Gender-Nonconforming People, Version 7, 13 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM 165, 168
(2011) (second emphasis added).
26. JONATHAN KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE
U.S.A. 197–205 (1976), reprinted in CARLOS A. BALL, JANE S. SCHACTER, DOUGLAS
NEJAIME & WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUALITY, GENDER
IDENTITY, AND THE LAW 19 (6th ed. 2017).
27. Id. at 20.
28. Jack Drescher, Out of DSM: Depathologizing Homosexuality, 5 BEHAV. SCI. 565,
565–66 (2015).
29. Gender Dysphoria Diagnosis, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry.
org/psychiatrists/cultural-competency/education/transgender-and-gender-nonconformingpatients/gender-dysphoria-diagnosis [https://perma.cc/3BQ8-Z8DP].
30. Stroumsa, supra note 20, at e31.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Coleman et al., supra note 25, at 168.
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population] has historically been, and continues to be, overlooked by
governmental, health care, and academic establishments.”34 This is particularly troubling because transgender people present particularized medical needs. For example, within that population, some transgender persons
may suffer from gender dysphoria. Research indicates that the failure to
provide the necessary medical treatment to counter the symptoms of
“gender dysphoria can result in depression, suicidality, auto-castration,
and death.”35
Generally, gender dysphoria describes “discomfort or distress that is
caused by a discrepancy between a person’s gender identity and that person’s sex assigned at birth.”36 Not all transgender people present gender
dysphoria, however. In fact, “Only some gender-nonconforming people
experience gender dysphoria at some point in their lives.”37 The severity
of gender dysphoria can vary significantly. For some, the distress associated with gender dysphoria may necessitate a formal diagnosis.38 An official diagnosis indicates that an individual not only exhibits a marked
incongruence between gender identity and assigned sex, but also that this
incongruence manifests in “clinically significant distress or impairment in
social, school, or other important areas of functioning.”39 Thus, though all
transgender individuals exhibit incongruence between gender and sex,
only a subset of the population presents the clinically significant distress
or impairment that necessitates a formal diagnosis of gender dysphoria.
The formal diagnosis is not intended to stigmatize the individual but
rather to identify the symptoms resulting from gender dysphoria.40 Significantly, formal diagnoses can facilitate access to necessary health care and
effective forms of treatment, including hormone therapy and gender confirmation surgery41 (GCS).42 Here, doctors should provide particularized
care by consulting the World Professional Association for Transgender
Health (WPATH) Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual,
Transgender, and Gender-Nonconforming People (SOC).43
In short, not all transgender people possess the clinically significant distress to merit a diagnosis of gender dysphoria. An official diagnosis is
necessary to secure access to particular forms of treatment, including
GCS. The failure to treat gender dysphoria poses a serious risk to an
individual’s health and may result in death or bodily harm.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Stroumsa, supra note 20, at e31.
Clark et al., supra note 10, at 81.
Coleman et al., supra note 25, at 166.
Id. at 168.
Id.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 452 (5th ed. 2013).
40. See Coleman et al., supra note 25, at 169.
41. Some cases continue to use Sex Reassignment Surgery (SRS), an outdated term
for Gender Confirmation Surgery. For the purposes of this Comment, the author uses GCS
to de-emphasize surgery as a necessary part of transition.
42. Coleman et al., supra note 25, at 169.
43. See generally id. (advocating for the WPATH Standards of Care).
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III. CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE RIGHT TO INMATE
HEALTH CARE
The Eighth Amendment states, “Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”44 However, neither the Supreme Court nor the Founders has defined the exact scope of “cruel and unusual.”45 This Section shows that
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment grants inmates a
constitutional right to adequate health care. A failure by prison administrators to provide adequate care would, in effect, impose a condition of
confinement analogous to the very punishment prohibited by the
Constitution.
A. EIGHTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINAL MEANING
The Eighth Amendment’s historical roots trace back to English law.46
During the drafting of Virginia’s constitution, Section 9 of the Declaration of Rights included a “verbatim copy” of the English Bill of Rights
prohibition.47 Subsequent to the inclusion in the Virginia Constitution,
eight states adopted an identical provision, the federal government included the clause in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and the provision
became the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution in
1791.48 Some legal historians argue that cruel and unusual punishment—
as understood by the drafters of the English Bill of Rights—represented
more than just a reaction to torture, harsh sentences, and assizes.49 However, the Founding Fathers primarily understood the clause “to outlaw
torture and other cruel punishments.”50
After its adoption, the Eighth Amendment was rarely invoked, primarily because the barbarous treatments used in the United Kingdom were
not commonplace in the United States.51 In fact, early attempts to
broaden the meaning of the clause—namely, to extend the prohibition to
disproportionate punishment—were futile.52 For this reason, some early
commentators “believed the clause to be obsolete.”53
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
45. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (“The exact scope of the constitutional
phrase ‘cruel and unusual’ has not been detailed by this Court.”).
46. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The
Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and unusual punishments derives from English
law.”).
47. Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969).
48. Id.
49. Furman, 408 U.S. at 318; see also Granucci, supra note 47, at 860.
50. Furman, 408 U.S. at 319; see also Granucci, supra note 47, at 862–65.
51. Granucci, supra note 47, at 842.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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B. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT & EVOLVING MEANING
The Supreme Court has not limited the amendment’s protections to a
mere prohibition on the torturous and barbarous punishments that were
commonplace in the eighteenth century.54 For example, in Weems v.
United States, the Supreme Court found a fifteen-year sentence disproportionate to the convictable offense and, thus, cruel and unusual punishment, signifying that the amendment’s protections are not pegged to the
original understanding.55 In doing so, the Court reasoned:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth. . . . In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of
what has been, but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in
efficacy and power. . . . Rights declared in words might be lost in
reality.56
Significantly, Weems stands for the proposition that the Eighth Amendment is dynamic, or “progressive,” rather than “fastened to the obsolete”;
accordingly, the Eighth Amendment can “acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”57
In essence, Weems paved the way for the introduction of the flexible
standard for cruel and unusual punishment—the evolving standards of
decency—coined by the Warren Court (1958–1969). Although the Warren Court did relatively little to expand the substance of prisoners’ rights,
this period of Supreme Court history featured several positive strides regarding Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, including: the formal incorporation of “the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments
to the states,” the guarantee of legal assistance for prison inmates, the
weakening of the historical deference given to state prison administration
by federal courts, and more.58
In Trop v. Dulles, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, concluded that a provision of the Nationality Act of 1940 (depriving an
American of U.S. citizenship following a conviction and dishonorable discharge related to military desertion) constituted cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.59 In doing so, the
Supreme Court, for the first time, observed that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man.”60 Noting that the Constitution is comprised of “vital, living princi54. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (“[T]he Amendment has been interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner.”).
55. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 362 (1910).
56. Id. at 373.
57. Id. at 378.
58. JOHN A. FLITER, PRISONERS’ RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND EVOLVING
STANDARDS OF DECENCY 69 (2001).
59. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 103 (1958).
60. Id. at 100.
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ples” rather than “time-worn adages or hollow shibboleths,” Chief Justice
Warren stated that “[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”61 For Warren, the Supreme Court’s failure to apply this dynamic
rather than static standard would render “the words of the Constitution . . . little more than good advice.”62
C. CONDITIONS

OF

CONFINEMENT: INMATE’S RIGHT
CARE

TO

MEDICAL

Though the Constitution “‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,’ . . .
neither does it permit inhumane ones.”63 While the Supreme Court initially confined the Eighth Amendment prohibition to “punishments,” the
Supreme Court broadened its application in proscribing more than simply
“physically barbarous punishments.”64 For example, under the Burger
Court, the Supreme Court began to more actively intervene in the administration of prisons by focusing on the “conditions of confinement.”65 Accordingly, beyond curtailing certain forms of punishment, the Eighth
Amendment now—in addition to placing restraints on prison officials—
also imposes significant duties upon these officials.66 Among these duties,
prison officials must “provide humane conditions of confinement; . . . ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical
care[;] and . . . ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the
inmates.’”67 Thus, “the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the
conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment.”68
Today, the denial of adequate medical care in prison constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment. Underlying this obligation is the reality that
prison inmates—by the very nature of incarceration—rely on prison authorities for their basic needs, including medical needs; without help from
prison authorities, these needs will not and cannot be met.69 For Justice
Marshall, the failure at worst “may actually produce physical ‘torture or a
lingering death,’” which were “the evils of most immediate concern to the
61. Id. at 101, 103 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 103–04.
63. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (emphasis added) (quoting Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)).
64. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976).
65. See FLITER, supra note 58, at 93.
66. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832.
67. Id. at 832–33 (emphasis added) (noting prison administrators are under an obligation “to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984))); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,
31–32 (1993); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225–26 (1990) (holding that when an
inmate’s mental disability poses a threat to the inmate population, the obligation for prison
administrators to ensure safety necessarily includes a provision of medical treatment for
the mental illness); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05 (“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs . . . constitutes [an] ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’” that violates the
Eighth Amendment (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976))).
68. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (citing Helling, 509 U.S. at 31).
69. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
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drafters of the Amendment.”70 In lesser cases, denial of care may impose
pain and suffering that fails to serve a penological purpose.71 Therefore,
the Constitution imposes an obligation on the State “to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for
himself.”72
In short, consistent with the evolving standards of decency, the Supreme Court applied the Eighth Amendment to conditions of confinement. In doing so, the Court imposed an array of duties on prison
officials, most notably, the obligation to provide adequate medical care.
IV. MEDICAL CARE FOR TRANSGENDER INMATES TODAY
Although the Eighth Amendment places an affirmative duty on prison
administrators to provide adequate medical care to transgender inmates,
research shows that the prison system is “ill-prepared to accommodate
the needs of transgender inmates.”73 Consequently, significant obstacles
remain for transgender inmates seeking access to care. These obstacles
include, but are not limited to, limited prison budgets, personal staff bias,
and lack of transgender cultural competence.74
Additionally, state legislatures play a critical role in undermining access to necessary care for transgender inmates. For instance, policies for
medical care actually available for transgender inmates significantly vary
among the fifty states.75 According to a 2015 study, twenty-eight states
prohibit transgender inmates from obtaining treatment once incarcerated; only thirteen states allow transgendered inmates to initiate hormone therapy, compared to twenty-one states that allow inmates to
continue hormone therapy; and seven states allow GCS.76 Further, the
U.S. courts of appeals contribute to the care-related obstacles for transgender inmates because these courts address gender-affirming care differently under the Estelle-Farmer framework. Under the current test, the
constitutional right to adequate health care is denied to transgender inmates. This Section explains the two-prong test for adequate health care
and the division in U.S. courts of appeals as it relates to transgender
health care, specifically GCS.
A. INADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE UNDER ESTELLE-FARMER
A prison official’s “deliberate indifference to [an inmate’s] serious
medical need[ ] . . . constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173).
72. Id. at 104.
73. Routh et al., supra note 5, at 5 (citing Syndey Tarzwell, The Gender Lines are
Marked with Razor Wire: Addressing State Prison Policies and Practices for the Management of Transgender Prisoners, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 167 (2006)).
74. Id. at 5–6, 18.
75. Id. at 19.
76. Id. at 12–18 & tbl.1. The study excludes ten states because relevant policies or
statutes were unlocatable. Id. at 18.
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pain’ . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”77 For an inmate to
prove an Eighth Amendment violation based on failure to provide adequate care, an inmate must show (1) a serious medical need and (2) that
prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the medical need.78 This
test contains both an objective and subjective prong.
In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court established this modern standard for inadequate care. There, J.W. Gamble sued the Director of the
Texas Department of Corrections and other prison officials for a failure
to provide adequate diagnosis and medical care following an injury sustained during a prison work assignment.79 Over a three-month period,
Gamble visited multiple medical personnel on seventeen occasions, in
which Gamble received treatment for a back injury, high blood pressure,
and other heart problems.80 The Estelle Court “conclude[d] that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” violates the Eighth
Amendment.81
Following Estelle, circuit courts differed as to whether the deliberate
indifference standard was an objective or subjective test.82 The Supreme
Court in Farmer v. Brennan defined the deliberate indifference standard
in the context of a gender dysphoric inmate, opting for the latter approach.83 There, prior to conviction at eighteen years old for credit card
fraud, Farmer began male-to-female transition, including shifting gender
expression, “under[going] estrogen therapy, receiv[ing] silicone breast
implants, and submit[ting] to unsuccessful ‘black market’ testicle-removal
surgery.”84 Although the record remains silent regarding Farmer’s inprison appearance, Farmer “claim[ed] to have continued hormonal treatment while incarcerated by using drugs smuggled into prison and . . . [to]
wear[ing] clothing in a feminine manner.”85 The Farmer Court held that,
to be deliberately indifferent, an official must “know[ ] of and disregard[ ]
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”86 In other words, the official
must (1) know of the substantial risk of serious harm and (2) have drawn
the inference of harm.87 Here, the Court remanded to determine whether
the prison officials would be liable under this standard.88
Ultimately, not every claim alleging inadequate care amounts to an
77. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
78. See LILY CHI-FANG TSAI, SUBSTANDARD MEDICAL CARE IN U.S. PRISONS: IMPROVEMENT THROUGH CIVIL LIABILITY ACTIONS 25–26 (Nicholas P. Lovrich ed., 2014).
79. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107.
80. Id. at 99, 107.
81. Id. at 104 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
82. Joel H. Thompson, Today’s Deliberate Indifference: Providing Attention Without
Providing Treatment to Prisoners with Serious Medical Needs, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV.
635, 637 (2010).
83. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
84. Id. at 829.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 837.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 848–49, 851.
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Eighth Amendment violation.89 For example, “an inadvertent failure to
provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ or to be ‘repugnant to the conscience
of mankind.’”90 Instead, an inmate must allege conduct “sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”91
Further, deliberate indifference applies solely to “action or inaction taken
in conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm.”92
B. CIRCUIT SPLIT JEOPARDIZES PRISONERS’ RIGHTS
Although circuit courts have addressed questions pertaining to gender
dysphoria and adequate care, relatively few courts have addressed the
narrower question of whether the Eighth Amendment guarantees gender
confirmation surgery. To highlight the disparity in jurisprudential treatment, this Section highlights the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits’ differing
approaches. These circuits illustrate, respectively, a (1) traditional caseby-case approach that declines to foreclose the possibility of Eighth
Amendment protection, (2) categorical ban of GCS, and (3) case-by-case
analysis constitutionalizing GCS. Thus, this Section demonstrates the unworkable standard established in Estelle-Farmer and that, unfortunately,
the Supreme Court has allowed this split to continue.93
1. The First Circuit: From Early Recognition to Subsequent Reversal
Michelle Kosilek suffers from a severe form of gender dysphoria, resulting in “constant mental anguish and, at times, abuse,” including suicide and autocastration attempts.94 Throughout her incarceration,
Kosilek sought treatment pursuant to the SOC.95 In Kosilek v. Maloney
(Kosilek I), Kosilek challenged the Department of Corrections (DOC)
Commisoner’s “blanket policy” that effectively restricted access to hormone therapy for those like Kosilek who had taken “black market” hormones and excluded the possibility of receiving GCS.96 Though Kosilek I
noted that the prison did not provide adequate care for Kosilek’s serious
medical need (gender dysphoria), the court found that Kosilek failed to
prove deliberate indifference.97
Interestingly, in 2014, Kosilek again alleged inadequate care in violation of the Eighth Amendment in Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II) after the
DOC refused to provide GCS, which the DOC doctors identified as the
89. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).
90. Id. at 105–06.
91. Id. at 106.
92. Thompson, supra note 82, at 638.
93. See, e.g., Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 141 S. Ct. 610, 610 (2020) (mem.), denying
cert. to 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019); Gibson v. Collier, 140 S. Ct. 653, 653 (2019) (mem.),
denying cert. to 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir.); Kosilek v. O’Brien, 575 U.S. 998, 998 (2015)
(mem.), denying cert. to 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014).
94. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 158 (D. Mass. 2002).
95. Id. at 159.
96. Id. at 160, 176.
97. Id. at 195.
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“only adequate” treatment for Kosilek’s severe gender dysphoria.98 The
Kosilek II court agreed with the doctors and concluded that Kosilek had a
serious medical need for which GCS was the only adequate treatment.99
Unlike Kosilek I, however, this court determined that the DOC acted
with deliberate indifference because the decision to deny the procedure
was neither made in good faith nor motivated by reasonable safety concerns.100 Instead, the court found that the DOC feared providing the procedure “would provoke public and political controversy, criticism, scorn,
and ridicule.”101 Thus, Kosilek II found that the DOC improperly violated the Eighth Amendment in denying Kosilek’s GCS.102 On appeal,
the First Circuit panel upheld this decision in Kosilek III, noting that the
court in Kosilek II did not clearly err in finding that (1) “Kosilek has a
serious medical need for the surgery” and (2) the DOC’s denial was “unsupported by legitimate penological considerations.”103
Despite this initial success for securing GCS as a form of necessary
care, in Kosilek IV, the First Circuit reheard the case en banc and overturned the holding and affirmation on appeal.104 Notably, Kosilek IV reframed the question: “[W]hether the decision not to provide [GCS]—in
light of the continued provision of all ameliorative measures currently
afforded Kosilek and in addition to antidepressants and psychotherapy—
is sufficiently harmful to Kosilek so as to violate the Eighth Amendment.”105 In deviating from prior holdings, this panel noted that “Kosilek
is provided hormones, facial hair removal, feminine clothing and accessories, and access to regular mental health treatment.”106 As a result of
these accommodations, Kosilek received some relief from her depressive
state and experienced “significant physical changes and an increasingly
feminine appearance.”107
Regarding the objective prong, the Kosilek IV court noted that, in the
case before it, GCS was not necessary, given successful treatment and
DOC’s plan to treat future suicidality.108 In so holding, the court refused
to foreclose the possibility of a different outcome under different facts,
stating that the decision will not “foreclose all litigants from successfully
seeking [GCS] in the future.”109 Finally, regarding the subjective prong,
the panel disagreed with the conclusion that DOC acted “by pretextual or
improper concerns with public pressure” in the absence of evidence.110
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197–98 (D. Mass. 2012) (emphasis added).
Id. at 238.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 203.
Id.
Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 F.3d 733, 772–73 (1st Cir. 2014).
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 96 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc).
Id. at 89.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 95–96.
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Overall, the First Circuit’s approach signifies early success in litigating
a transgender inmate’s constitutional right to medical care. Although the
First Circuit reversed en banc, the court’s analysis employs a case-by-case
approach to inadequate care analysis. Notably, the First Circuit does not
foreclose plausible claims for categorical denial of GCS.
2. The Fifth Circuit: A Categorical Ban Against Gender Confirmation
Surgery
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit in Gibson v. Collier concluded—over a
dissent—that a “state does not inflict cruel and unusual punishment by
declining to provide sex reassignment surgery to a transgender inmate.”111 There, Vanessa Lynn Gibson, a transgender woman in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, previously received a
formal diagnosis for gender dysphoria.112 For Gibson, gender dysphoria
manifests with acute distress, depression, and attempts at self-harm and
autocastration.113 Although suicidality was not solely linked to Gibson’s
gender dysphoria, gender dysphoria was a cause of Gibson’s
suicidality.114
In January 2017, Texas Department of Criminal Justice Policy G-51.11
regarding the treatment of offenders with gender dysphoria went into effect.115 Under the policy, inmates must be “evaluated by appropriate
medical and mental health professionals” to determine treatment “on a
case-by-case basis as clinically indicated.”116 Relying on this policy, Texas
doctors denied Gibson the opportunity for evaluation of whether GCS
was medically necessary to treat Gibson’s gender dysphoria.117 Instead,
following attempts to commit suicide and autocastrate, the state “started
mental health counseling and hormone therapy” for Gibson.118 Though
the treatment had some effect, it did not ameliorate the underlying gender dysphoria or its effects.119
Turning to Estelle-Farmer, the Gibson court acknowledged that Texas
did not contest the underlying serious medical need, in light of Gibson’s
“record of psychological distress, suicidal ideation, and threats of selfharm.”120 Therefore, the court solely focused on whether the State acted
with deliberate indifference in denying Gibson medical evaluation to determine the necessity of GCS and in denying the procedure itself.121 For
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 216–17.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 217–18; TEX. DEP’T CRIM. JUST., CORRECTIONAL MANAGED HEALTH CARE
POLICY MANUAL G-51.11 (2020), https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/divisions/cmhc/docs/cmhc_
policy_manual/G-51.11.pdf [https://perma.cc/824S-W7Z3].
116. CORRECTIONAL MANAGED HEALTH CARE POLICY MANUAL, supra note 115.
117. Gibson, 920 F.3d at 217–18.
118. Id. at 217.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 219.
121. Id. at 219–20.
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the court, this question largely turned on whether GCS could be seen as a
medically necessary form of treatment for gender dysphoria.122
With regard to the subjective prong, Gibson found that the State did
not act with deliberate indifference.123 In so holding, the court argued the
officials could not act with “malicious intent,” or “with knowledge that
they were withholding medically necessary care,” when “a genuine debate exists within the medical community about the necessity or efficacy
of that care.”124 Here, the court—unable to find a “consensus” that
amounted to “universal acceptance”—“doom[ed] Gibson’s claim.”125
Claiming to rely on the First Circuit’s analysis in Kosilek IV,126 the court
denied Gibson the opportunity to assess whether her personal medical
need necessitated the use of GCS, noting that evidence of individual need
would not affect the outcome of the case.127
However, the Fifth Circuit’s approach meaningfully differed from the
First Circuit’s approach in Kosilek IV.128 Notably, Gibson foreclosed the
opportunity to prove medical necessity itself.129 Judge Barksdale criticized the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on Kosilek IV in dissent, observing that
particular case “spanned over 20 years, had a very ‘expansive’ record, and
was not decided by summary judgment.”130 Further, Barksdale noted the
Fifth Circuit—in dismissing Gibson’s claim on summary judgment—
failed to account for “developments in the medical community regarding
treating gender dysphoria and determining the necessity for” GCS.131 Put
simply, “to reach its broader holding that denying GCS cannot, as a matter of law, violate the Eighth Amendment—in other words, to reject
every conceivable Eighth Amendment claim based on the denial of
GCS—the Fifth Circuit coopted the record from Kosilek.”132
In short, the Gibson majority rejected the deliberate indifference claim.
In doing so, the Fifth Circuit refused to find deliberate indifference when
the State “d[id] nothing more than refus[e] to provide medical treatment
whose necessity and efficacy is hotly disputed within the medical commu122. Id. at 224 (“[Gibson] cannot establish on remand that such surgery is universally
accepted as an effective or necessary treatment for gender dysphoria.”).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 220.
125. Id. at 220–21 (emphasis added).
126. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc).
127. Gibson, 920 F.3d at 224.
128. Compare id. (“We do not see how evidence of individual need would change the
result in this case, however. Any evidence of Gibson’s personal medical need would not
alter the fact that sex reassignment surgery is fiercely debated within the medical community.”), with Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 91 (“[T]he DOC has specifically disclaimed any attempt to
create a blanket policy regarding [GCS]. We are confident that the DOC will abide by this
assurance, as any such policy would conflict with the requirement that medical care be individualized based on a particular prisoner’s serious medical needs.” (emphasis added)).
129. See Samantha Braver, Note, Circuit Court Dysphoria: The Status of Gender Confirmation Surgery Requests by Incarcerated Transgender Individuals, 120 COLUM. L. REV.
2235, 2259 (2020).
130. Gibson, 920 F.3d at 233 (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 795 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
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nity.”133 Thus, the Fifth Circuit’s approach is tantamount to a categorical
ban on the use of GCS.
3. The Ninth Circuit: Constitutionalizing Gender Confirmation Surgery
on a Case-by-Case Basis
Adree Edmo is a transgender woman currently in the custody of the
Idaho Department of Corrections.134 The incongruity between Edmo’s
sex assigned at birth and gender identity resulted in severe distress,
“limit[ing] [Edmo’s] ability to function.”135 As a result, Edmo “twice attempted self-castration to remove her male genitalia, which cause[d] her
profound anguish.”136 Consequently, all parties and medical experts
agreed that Edmo suffers from gender dysphoria, that it is a serious medical need, and that GCS is among the necessary forms of treatment.137
“[T]he district court concluded that GCS is medically necessary for Edmo
and ordered the State to provide the surgery.”138 This decision relied on
testimony from Edmo’s medical experts—arguing for medical necessity—
and dismissed the State’s experts who “lacked relevant experience” and
could not justify why they deviated from accepted treatment
guidelines.139
Regarding the objective prong of Estelle-Farmer, the court noted that
not even the State could justifiably rebut the fact that “Edmo’s gender
dysphoria is a sufficiently serious medical need to trigger the State’s obligations under the Eighth Amendment.”140 In doing so, the Edmo court
relied on the DSM-5 and Edmo’s testimony to show how gender
dysphoria—and accompanying symptoms—have severely impacted
Edmo’s ability to function.141 Specifically, the court observed, “her gender dysphoria causes her to feel ‘depressed,’ ‘disgusting,’ ‘tormented,’ and
‘hopeless,’ and it has caused past efforts and active thoughts of self-castration.”142 Accordingly, the court concluded that the State had an obligation to provide adequate care to counter Edmo’s gender dysphoria.143
The State, however, failed to provide adequate care, and the court determined that Edmo clearly demonstrated how the “‘course of treatment’
chosen to alleviate her gender dysphoria ‘was medically unacceptable
under the circumstances.’”144 In rejecting the State’s expert testimony,
the court noted that these experts “lack meaningful experience directly
treating people with gender dysphoria,” specifically: “having treated indi133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Gibson, 920 F.3d at 226.
Edmo, 935 F.3d at 767.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 785.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 786.
Id.
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viduals with gender dysphoria, having evaluated individuals for GCS, and
having treated them post-operatively.”145 Further, the court treated the
State’s testimony skeptically because it “ran contrary to the established
standards of care in the areas of transgender health care.”146
Turning to the subjective prong, the court determined the State acted
with deliberate indifference in its treatment of Edmo.147 The State, on
appeal, argued it could not have acted with deliberate indifference because it (1) did not act with “malice, intent to inflict pain, or knowledge
that [the] recommended course of treatment was medically inappropriate” and (2) “provided some care.”148 With respect to the first argument,
the Edmo court concluded that “[t]he State misstated the standard.”149
Under Farmer, Edmo simply had to show that an official acted or failed
to act despite knowledge of a substantial risk of harm.150 Despite the
State’s knowledge of Edmo’s self-castration attempts, it failed to adjust
its treatment plan.151 Accordingly, Edmo showed the State failed to take
steps to mitigate the substantial risk of harm.152 With respect to the second argument, the court stated, “The provision of some medical treatment, even extensive treatment over a period of years, does not
immunize officials from the Eighth Amendment’s requirements.”153
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s conclusion that
the State violated Edmo’s Eighth Amendment right when it failed to provide medically necessary GCS despite a substantial risk of ongoing and
future harm.154 Like the First Circuit’s decision in Kosilek, this required a
factual assessment of Edmo’s condition, the prison’s knowledge of the
continued risk of Edmo’s gender dysphoria, and the administration’s failure to act in light of this knowledge. Notably, however, unlike Kosilek,
“important factual differences between [the] cases yield different outcomes.”155 Subsequently, a rehearing en banc was denied despite the fact
Edmo effectively became the first circuit court to constitutionalize an inmate’s right to GCS.156
In short, the approaches embraced by the First, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits highlight the unworkability of the existing standard in producing
predictable outcomes. Consequently, these differing standards jeopardize
transgender inmates’ rights to receive medically necessary care. For this
145. Id. at 787–88.
146. Id. at 788.
147. Id. at 797.
148. Id. at 793 (alteration in original).
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir.
2013)).
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 780–81.
155. Id. at 794.
156. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 949 F.3d 489, 490 (9th Cir. 2020) (rehearing en banc denied) (O’Scannlain, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc).
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reason, the Supreme Court must reconsider the application of the EstelleFarmer framework in GCS cases.
V. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE ESTELLE-FARMER
FRAMEWORK
Responding to the circuit split, this Section addresses both the objective and subjective prongs of Estelle-Farmer in the context of GCS. Ultimately, it argues that gender dysphoria per se constitutes a serious
medical need under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Further, advancement in medical science demonstrates that there is a consensus regarding
the efficacy of GCS as a necessary form of treatment in severe cases of
gender dysphoria. Accordingly, this Section argues (1) that gender
dysphoric inmates have a constitutional right to GCS, implicit in the right
to adequate medical care, and (2) that categorical prohibitions against
this form of treatment are per se deliberately indifferent. Thus, this Comment proposes a refined question under the Estelle-Farmer framework to
account for administrative interests without jeopardizing the constitutional rights of transgender inmates: Under the facts of any particular
case, is gender confirmation surgery necessary to mitigate the serious risk
of harm posed by the inmate’s gender dysphoria?
A. GENDER DYSPHORIA POSES

A

SERIOUS MEDICAL NEED PER SE

The Supreme Court in Hudson v. McMillian157 limited inadequate
health care claims to those in which the needs presented are “serious”
“[b]ecause society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified
access to health care.”158 The Court has not defined what constitutes a
“serious” need, however, leaving that decision to lower courts.159 A consequence of this framework is that “what one court may consider to be a
serious medical need, another may reject.”160 The First, Third, Sixth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits assess whether the condition is one: “(1)
that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment; (2) that is
so obvious that a lay person would recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention; or (3) for which the delay of or inadequacy of treatment would
result in a substantial risk of harm.”161 On the other hand, the Second
and Ninth Circuits consider: “(1) the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or
treatment; (2) the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or (3) the existence of chronic or substantial pain.”162
157. 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
158. Id. at 9; see also Haley Loutfy, Health Care Behind Bars: Constructing a Uniform
Deliberate Indifference Standard to Prevent the Use of the Eighth Amendment as Broad
Prison Reform, 45 LINCOLN L. REV. 77, 89 (2018).
159. Loutfy, supra note 158, at 80.
160. Id. at 81.
161. Id. at 82.
162. Id. at 83.
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Over time, courts have found that a wide range of conditions constitute
serious medical needs, including: arthritis and hepatitis C;163 stomach
masses, constipation, and testicular cysts;164 severe chest pain and a subsequent heart attack;165 and more.166 Under Estelle, a serious medical
need is not limited to physical conditions; instead, a serious medical need
may be a “psychiatric or psychological condition.”167 Notably, some
courts have concluded that psychological needs—especially those resulting in suicidality—constitute serious medical needs.168
Gender dysphoria falls within the purview of recognized serious medical needs. Specifically, gender dysphoria is a diagnosable mental condition accompanied by clinically significant “discomfort or distress”
resulting from the incongruity “between a person’s gender identity and
that person’s sex assigned at birth.”169 Additionally, severe gender
dysphoria can result in depression, suicidality, autocastration, and
death.170 Therefore, to be diagnosed with gender dysphoria is to be diagnosed with a serious medical need. In effect, it is the equivalent of having
a recognized mental condition that causes symptoms also recognized as
serious needs.
This conclusion is supported by court precedent.171 For example,
163. Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 861 (7th Cir. 2011); Christy v. Robinson, 216 F. Supp.
2d 398, 413 (D. N.J. 2002).
164. MacLeod v. Kern, 424 F. Supp. 2d 260, 265 (D. Mass. 2006).
165. Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 752–56 (10th Cir. 2005).
166. TSAI, supra note 78, at 94; see also Laura R. Givens, Why the Courts Should Consider Gender Identity Disorder a Per Se Serious Medical Need for Eighth Amendment Purposes, 16 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 579, 601–02 (2013).
167. Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Partridge v. Two
Unknown Police Officers, 791 F.2d 1182, 1187 (5th Cir. 1986)); see also Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 272–73 (7th Cir. 1983); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 574 (10th Cir.
1980); Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 763 (3d Cir. 1979); Bowring
v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977).
168. See Lord v. Beahm, 952 F.3d 902, 904 (7th Cir. 2020) (“All agree that suicide is an
objectively serious medical condition.”); Luckert v. Dodge Cnty., 684 F.3d 808, 817 (8th
Cir. 2012); Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001) (“While the right to
medical care for serious medical needs does not encompass the right ‘to be screened correctly for suicidal tendencies,’ we have long held that prison officials who have been
alerted to a prisoner’s serious medical needs are under an obligation to offer medical care
to such a prisoner.”).
169. Coleman et al., supra note 25, at 166.
170. Clark et al., supra note 10, at 81.
171. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 90–91 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc); De’lonta v.
Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding that prison officials have a duty to
protect De’lonta from debilitating effects of her gender dysphoria, namely protection
against continued self-mutilation); Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 217 (5th Cir. 2019);
Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the lower court determined that gender dysphoria is a serious medical need, a point uncontested by the State);
Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987) (“There is no reason to treat
transsexualism differently than any other psychiatric disorder. Thus . . . plaintiff’s complaint does state a ‘serious medical need.’”); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir.
1988) (“[T]ranssexualism is a serious medical need.”); Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757,
795 (9th Cir. 2019); Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that
Rosati stated a plausible Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate care of her severe gender dysphoria); Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 229 (D. Mass. 2012); Kosilek v.
Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 195 (D. Mass. 2002).
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neither party questioned whether gender dysphoria constituted a serious
medical need in Gibson v. Collier because of the “record of psychological
distress, suicidal ideation, and threats of self-harm.”172 Similarly, in Edmo
v. Corizon, Inc., the State did not dispute whether gender dysphoria constituted a serious medical need.173 In that case, the Ninth Circuit strongly
stated that the particular conclusion could not even be disputed by the
State.174 Consequently, by arguing gender dysphoria, inmates implicate
their rights to the Eighth Amendment guarantee of adequate care.
B. GENDER CONFIRMATION IS A NECESSARY FORM
FOR GENDER DYSPHORIA

OF

TREATMENT

The Supreme Court routinely considers the opinions of the medical
and broader scientific community when assessing cruel and unusual punishment.175 For example, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court determined that the death penalty for those who are cognitively disabled is
unconstitutional.176 There, the Court relied on “clinical definitions of
mental retardation” to demonstrate “abundant evidence” that the cognitively disabled “often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan,” such that it “diminish[es] their personal culpability.”177
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons concluded that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of the death penalty for offenders
under eighteen.178 In doing so, the Court relied on “scientific and sociological studies” that demonstrated that those under the age of eighteen
(1) are subject to more negative influences and outside pressures and (2)
possess diminished culpability for the severity and consequences of their
actions.179 Finally, in Hall v. Florida, the Supreme Court again relied on
scientific measurement (IQ score) of a defendant’s abilities to invalidate
a Florida statute that “create[d] an unacceptable risk that persons with
intellectual disability will be executed.”180
In sum, the judiciary generally looks to medical consensus when assessing questions of medical necessity or adequate care. This applies even
when a court evaluates the needs of a transgender inmate.181 Here, the
172. Gibson, 920 F.3d at 219.
173. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 785.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–20 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 709 (2014).
176. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319, 321.
177. Id. at 318.
178. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79.
179. Id. at 569.
180. Hall, 572 U.S. at 704.
181. See Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 786 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Accepted standards
of care and practice within the medical community are highly relevant in determining what
care is medically acceptable and unacceptable.”); Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 553–54 (7th
Cir. 2011) (outlining the standards of care dictating the treatment for gender dysphoria);
Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Secr’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020) (Wilson, J.,
dissenting) (relying on medical community standards of care for gender dysphoric
patients).
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medical community accepts that gender dysphoria—and most significantly, its accompanying symptoms—can be alleviated through treatment.182 Once an individual receives a formal diagnosis, treatment
necessitates medical professionals to “assist people with such distress to
explore their gender identity and find a gender role that is comfortable
for them.”183 Accordingly, care is necessarily individualized.184
In providing care, the WPATH’s SOC are the foundational guidelines
for gender-affirming care. Indeed, the SOC outline what the medical
community views as adequate care for transgender patients. Notably,
many courts recognize that the SOC are the leading source for transgender health care, and these courts frequently rely on them for legal
analysis.185 For example, in Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., the court observed
that “most courts agree” that the SOC are the “internationally recognized guidelines for the treatment of individuals with gender
dysphoria.”186
According to the SOC, the two avenues for alleviating gender
dysphoria are (1) social support changes and (2) psychological or medical
treatment.187 Together, these forms of treatment fall under the umbrella
of gender-affirming care for transgender patients. The social support
changes include: in-person and online peer support resources and community-based groups for transgender people and their families; voice
therapy to accord with perceptions of gender identity; hair removal treatment; formal, legal changes in name and gender markers; and breast
binding or padding, genital tucking, penile prostheses, or hip padding.188
The social modifications may be in addition to or an alternative to psychological and medical treatment, depending on the needs of the particular individual.189 Some individuals may require psychological or medical
treatment to alleviate gender dysphoria. These options include: psychotherapy to address the negative impact of gender dysphoria on mental
health and internalized transphobia; changes in gender expression and
role; hormone therapy to feminize or masculinize the body; and surgery
to modify primary, secondary, or both kinds of characteristics.190
Some question the necessity of GCS and its protection under the
Eighth Amendment. These opponents generally deny the necessity of
GCS for two reasons. First, opponents point to fringe disagreement in the
182. See Coleman et al., supra note 25, at 170–71.
183. Id. at 168.
184. See id.
185. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 788 n.16 (“WPATH [SOC] . . . ‘are the internationally recognized guidelines for the treatment of individuals with gender dysphoria.’”); De’lonta v.
Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522–23 (4th Cir. 2013) (describing the SOC as “the generally accepted protocols for the treatment of” gender dysphoria); Fields, 653 F.3d at 553–54 (explaining “accepted standards of care” for patients with gender dysphoria).
186. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 769.
187. Coleman et al., supra note 25, at 171–72.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 171.
190. Id.
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medical community to undermine the medical consensus. Second, opponents argue that gender confirmation cannot be medically necessary if
alternative forms of treatment exist and yield positive results.
For example, despite the overwhelming medical support for GCS, the
Fifth Circuit nevertheless questioned the universality of the SOC in Gibson v. Collier in the context of GCS.191 There, the court argued that the
SOC merely represent “one side in a sharply contested medical debate
over” GCS.192 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit claims that “it is indisputable that the necessity and efficacy of [GCS] is a matter of significant disagreement within the medical community.”193 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit
deviated from the consensus among both court opinions194 and apparent
medical authority.195 Thus, the Fifth Circuit is an outlier in its failure to
recognize the consensus surrounding the SOC.196
On the other hand, individualized care does not undermine medical
necessity. Particularized care is common in the medical community, with
doctors evaluating presenting conditions and recommending a course of
treatment to respond to those individual needs. The use of alternative
treatments for an individual does not undermine the necessity of a specific treatment for the condition itself. For example, a cancer patient who
can be successfully treated through surgical removal does not invalidate
chemotherapy and radiation therapy as necessary forms of treatment for
the generalized condition of cancer. Thus, case-by-case treatment does
not undermine necessary treatment for conditions, generally.
When assessing gender dysphoria, prison officials should rely on the
SOC, the leading guideline on transgender health care. Care must be individualized, ranging from changes in gender expression to GCS. Put simply, “[s]ome patients may need hormones, a possible change in gender
role, but not surgery; others may need a change in gender role along with
surgery but not hormones.”197 Significantly, medical professionals overwhelmingly agree that hormone therapy and GCS are among the array of
medically necessary treatments for gender dysphoria. Therefore, GCS is a
191. Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 221 (5th Cir. 2019).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 216.
194. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 769, 795 (9th Cir. 2019).
195. Significant medical authority supports the conclusion that GCS is a medically necessary procedure to treat gender dysphoria. For example, major professional associations
have indicated the support for gender-affirming care, including the American Medical Association; the American Medical Student Association; the American Psychiatric Association; the American Psychological Association; the American Family Practice Association;
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists; the Endocrine Society; the National
Association of Social Workers; the American Academy of Plastic Surgeons; the American
College of Surgeons; Health Professionals Advancing LGBTQ Equality; the HIV
Medicine Association, the Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay, and Transgender Physician Assistant
Caucus; and Mental Health America. See Edmo, 935 F.3d at 795; see also Stroumsa, supra
note 20, at e33.
196. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 795.
197. Coleman et al., supra note 25, at 171.
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medically necessary form of treatment for gender dysphoria, which is a
recognizable serious medical need.
C. CATEGORICAL BANS OF NECESSARY CARE ARE PER SE
DELIBERATELY INDIFFERENT
Policies that categorically preclude the use of medically necessary
forms of treatment are per se deliberately indifferent because they
amount to conscious decisions to refuse necessary care or to provide a
lesser form of treatment. Therefore, categorical prohibitions are tantamount to deliberate indifferent decisions.
Under Farmer v. Brennan, the deliberate indifference standard lies
“somewhere between the poles of negligence at one end and purpose or
knowledge at the other.”198 Therefore, while deliberate indifference is
“more than mere negligence,” a plaintiff need not show “acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with [the] knowledge that
harm will result.”199 According to the Supreme Court in Farmer, a higher
purpose standard does not apply to challenges against conditions of confinement.200 Thus, the Farmer Court noted,
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.201
Notably, however, this test does not require a showing of an act or omission “believing that harm actually would befall an inmate.”202 Instead, a
claimant simply must show that an “official acted or failed to act despite
his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.”203 Therefore, the
Eighth Amendment protects against the risk of future harm, meaning
that the plaintiff need not have suffered the harm yet.204
Accordingly, “The knowledge of the need for medical care and intentional refusal to provide that care . . . constitute deliberate indifference.”205 In addition, some courts have found that the decision to provide
less efficacious care constitutes deliberate indifference.206
198. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994).
199. Id. at 835 (emphasis added).
200. See id. at 835–37.
201. Id. at 837.
202. Id. at 842.
203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993).
205. Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing
Robinson v. Moreland, 655 F.2d 887, 889–90 (8th Cir. 1981)); accord Ramos v. Lamm, 639
F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980) (“Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is shown
when prison officials have prevented an inmate from receiving recommended treatment or
when an inmate is denied access to medical personnel capable of evaluating the need for
treatment.”).
206. Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 441 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] doctor’s choice of the
‘easier and less efficacious treatment’ for an objectively serious medical condition can still
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Courts have questioned categorical bars to medically necessary treatments for gender dysphoria.207 For example, in Fields v. Smith, gender
dysphoric inmates challenged a Wisconsin statute that prohibited both
the provision of hormone therapy and GCS.208 There, the court took issue with the fact that the Wisconsin statute “ban[ned] treatment to all
prisoners,” regardless of whether hormones and GCS were deemed medically necessary by medical professionals.209 Accordingly, the court firmly
stated, “It is well established that the Constitution’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishment does not permit a state to deny effective treatment
for the serious medical needs of prisoners.”210 In reaching this conclusion,
the Fields court constructed a hypothetical statute limiting cancer treatment for inmates to therapy and painkillers.211 Using this hypothetical,
the court determined that it would clearly be seen as unconstitutional.212
Therefore, the provision of some treatment is insufficient where a serious
medical need cannot be treated because of a blanket prohibition against
the necessary form of treatment.213 For Fields, the refusal to provide this
treatment was constitutionally invalid as it served no “penological” purpose and was tantamount to torture.214
The failure to treat gender dysphoria poses an undeniable substantial
risk of harm. As noted, the medical community identified ongoing depression, suicidality, autocastration, and death as potential outcomes for
failure to treat gender dysphoria.215 Consequently, these symptoms may
result in torture or lingering death for an untreated inmate. Like other
cases concerning adequate medical care, a failure to treat gender
dysphoria presents the very harm that the Eighth Amendment is inamount to deliberate indifference for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.”); McCarthy v.
Maitland Place, 313 F. App’x. 810, 814–15 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that a conscious decision
to provide less efficacious treatment can constitute deliberate indifference); McElligott v.
Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999) (“We have also held that deliberate indifference
may be established by a showing of grossly inadequate care as well as by a decision to take
an easier but less efficacious course of treatment.”); Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698,
703 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A] physician may be deliberately indifferent if he or she consciously
chooses ‘an easier and less efficacious’ treatment plan.”).
207. See Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 2011); Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F.
Supp. 2d 228, 247, 252 (D. Mass. 2012) (holding that a DOC policy that placed a categorical
ban against laser hair removal, cosmetic surgery, and GCS to treat gender dysphoric inmates violated the Eighth Amendment by refusing to provide necessary evaluation and
care for medical needs).
208. Fields, 653 F.3d at 557.
209. Id. (emphasis added); see also Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 866–67 (E.D.
Wis. 2010) (“The statute applies irrespective of an inmate’s serious medical need or the
DOC’s clinical judgment . . . . The reach of this statute is sweeping inasmuch as it is applicable to any inmate who is now in the custody of the DOC or may at any time be in the
custody of the DOC, as well as any medical professional who may consider hormone therapy or [GCS] as necessary treatment for an inmate.”).
210. Fields, 653 F.3d at 556.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Clark et al., supra note 10, at 81.
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tended to prevent. For this reason, gender dysphoria clearly presents a
serious medical need.
To mitigate these symptoms, doctors follow the triadic approach established by the SOC, including: living in the preferred gender role, hormone therapy, and GCS.216 The knowledge of gender dysphoria—
specifically, the severity of its symptoms—and the intentional refusal to
provide medical evaluations for necessary treatment is deliberate indifference. Further, categorical prohibitions against particular forms of
treatment present constitutional concerns. Specifically, a prohibition
against GCS deprives all inmates of access to a form of treatment that
may be of medical necessity. Instead, it signals a decision to provide a
lesser form of treatment instead of what a doctor may deem a medical
necessity in a particular case. Under the proposed standard, categorical
prohibitions against the evaluation for and use of GCS would constitute
deliberate indifference.
VI. ADDRESSING COUNTERARGUMENTS
Under this Comment’s proposed rule, courts should consider whether
GCS is a medically necessary procedure to mitigate the substantial risks
presented by an inmate’s particular case of gender dysphoria. In doing so,
the court will rely on the understanding that (1) gender dysphoria is a
substantial medical need; (2) GCS is considered a medically necessary
form of treatment; (3) in determining adequate care, medical necessity
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis in recognition of the fact that
care for gender dysphoria is individualized; and (4) the categorical denial
of treatment deemed medically necessary itself is per se deliberately
indifferent.
This Section addresses two common arguments advanced by opponents
of extending constitutional protection to gender-affirming care: (1) the
proposed rule empowers inmate choice in health care; and (2) cost is a
legitimate factor in denying access to GCS. This Comment ultimately argues that these critiques fail to fulfill the Eighth Amendment’s call to
provide adequate care.
A. THIS RULE DOES NOT EMPOWER INMATE CHOICE

OF

TREATMENT

Historically, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution neither
requires comfortable prisons nor permits inhumane ones.217 Accordingly,
“Prison conditions may be ‘restrictive and even harsh.’”218 Further,
courts have held that mere disagreement regarding the form of treatment
an inmate should receive does not result in a constitutional violation.219
216. Coleman et al., supra note 25, at 170–71.
217. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
218. Id. at 833 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
219. Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Secr’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1274 (11th Cir. 2020); Lamb
v. Norwood, 899 F.3d 1159, 1163 (10th Cir. 2018).
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One concern associated with this proposed rule is that it empowers inmates to exercise choice over their treatment through threats of suicidality or autocastration. This would be tantamount to valorizing
disagreements regarding choice of treatment. In addition, this critique relates to a broader argument that denying access to a form of treatment is
not the same as denying access to care itself. In this vein, the provision of
some treatment—even treatment inconsistent with patient needs—is sufficient to constitute adequate care. This misstates the question underlying
claims for inadequate care. The threshold question is whether an inmate
possesses a serious medical need that poses a substantial risk of harm.
Consequently, the question is not what form of treatment the patient may
prefer but rather what form of treatment is recommended by a healthcare
professional.
To help answer this question, the SOC outline criteria for gender-affirming surgery.220 In assessing whether an inmate qualifies for GCS, doctors consider different factors depending on the type of procedure
required. The criteria for breast/chest surgery or breast augmentation, for
example, include: persistent, well-documented gender dysphoria; capacity
to make an informed decision; age of majority in the country; and control
of medical or mental health conditions, if present.221 With respect to genital surgery, the threshold is higher: persistent, well-documented gender
dysphoria; capacity to make an informed decision; age of majority; control of medical and mental health conditions, if present; and twelve
months of hormone therapy, unless hormones are not clinically indicated.222 Some procedures require an additional twelve-month period of
living in a gender role congruent with gender identity.223 Therefore, inmates cannot dictate the course of their treatment simply by alleging
mental health, suicidality, or autocastration concerns. Instead, to qualify
for particular forms of treatment, an individual must satisfy the threshold
criteria for the recommended procedure.
Though some of these prerequisites are relatively easy to satisfy, demonstrating a persistent, well-documented case of gender dysphoria is not.
To satisfy this prerequisite, an inmate cannot simply exhibit incongruence
between gender and sex.224 Instead, a diagnosis of gender dysphoria is
contingent upon clinically significant distress or impairment that interferes with critical areas of functioning.225 This diagnosis itself provides
the serious medical need that triggers the Constitution’s guarantee of adequate care to mitigate the substantial risk of harm.
The concerns about inmate control over treatment plans do not align
with the reality of medical treatment for gender dysphoria. Specifically,
the critique overemphasizes the role of the inmate and de-emphasizes the
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Coleman et al., supra note 25, at 201–02.
Id.
Id. at 202.
Id.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 39, at 452–53.
Id.
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presenting symptoms and documented medical history necessary to secure hormone therapy and GCS. In cases of severe gender dysphoria, the
question of care is not one of choice. The recommended procedures are
neither elective nor cosmetic. They are medically necessary to respond to
the underlying condition, gender dysphoria, and to mitigate the ongoing
risks of accompanying symptoms. Accordingly, the denial of access to adequate medical care is not “part of the penalty that criminal offenders
pay for their offenses against society.”226 The provision of adequate care
is consistent with the evolving standards of decency. Therefore, the denial
of necessary care—including, but not limited to, the denial of GCS—
serves no legitimate penological purpose.
B. COST IS

AN

ILLEGITIMATE INTEREST IN DENYING ACCESS
NECESSARY CARE

TO

Cost is a commonly cited factor by opponents of providing gender-affirming care to prison inmates. Some argue that limited prison budgets
necessarily require prison administrators to make financial trade-offs
when assessing what form of treatment should be offered for a serious
medical need. In this regard, prison officials sometimes provide lesser
forms of care to save the cost associated with GCS itself. This argument
improperly elevates cost concerns over substantial medical needs and, by
extension, deprives prisoners of adequate care in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
A strict reliance on cost to avoid the provision of medically necessary
care is inconsistent with Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Cost may be
considered in light of prison administration. However, the cost assessment must be between two equally effective forms of medical treatment.
If the choice is between a costly but effective form of treatment and a
cheap but ineffective form of treatment, cost would serve as a barrier
preventing access to adequate care itself.
Underlying the Court’s reasoning to protect inmates from poor conditions of confinement is the belief that society justly bears a cost to provide
adequate care, else the conditions are tantamount to torturous punishment.227 For example, in Spicer v. Williamson, the court outlined the
common law view that society is obligated to provide care for prison inmates: “The prisoner[,] by his arrest[,] is deprived of his liberty for the
protection of the public. It is but just that the public be required to care
for the prisoner, who cannot, by reason of the deprivation of his liberty,
care for himself.”228 Further, Estelle v. Gamble tied this societal obligation to the provision of adequate medical care: prison inmates rely on
officials to respond to their medical needs, and a failure for authorities to
226.
227.
832–34
228.

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
(1994).
Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926) (emphasis added).
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treat these needs risks perpetuating pain and suffering.229 According to
the Estelle court, this “unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency.”230
Notably, some courts have addressed the cost concern in the context of
gender dysphoric inmates.231 In Kosilek II, the District Ct. of Massachusetts stated, “It is not, however, permissible to deny an inmate adequate
medical care because it is costly.”232 Accordingly, the court observed that
prison officials have paid for various expensive procedures—CAT scans,
dialysis, etc.—to treat serious medical needs.233 Further, Fields v. Smith
addressed the cost concern when invalidating a Wisconsin statute that
prohibited the use of taxpayer funds for hormone therapy or GCS.234
There, the Seventh Circuit noted that the DOC pays for “other significant
surgeries” that “may be more expensive” than GCS, including coronary
bypass and kidney transplants.235 In doing so, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the “DOC might actually incur greater costs
by refusing to provide hormones.”236 These additional costs may include
“other expensive treatments or enhanced monitoring by prison
security.”237
Further, several studies indicate that the provision of gender-affirming
care is actually a cost-saving mechanism in the long-term.238 For example,
a study conducted by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public
Health “analyze[d] the cost-effectiveness of health insurance coverage for
medically necessary and preventive services compared to no coverage.”239 In the study, researchers found the provision of care to be costeffective at the five- and ten-year marks.240 The study noted that “[w]hile
justice, legality, and a desire to avoid discrimination should drive decisions about benefit coverage,” the economic argument is ultimately an
229. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
230. Id. at 103.
231. See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 81 (1st Cir. 2014) (en banc); Fields v.
Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 555–56 (7th Cir. 2011); Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir.
1997); Campbell v. Kallas, No. 16-cv-261-jdp, 2020 WL 7230235, at *8 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 8,
2020); Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 161 (D. Mass. 2002).
232. Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. at 161.
233. Id.
234. Fields, 653 F.3d at 555–56.
235. Id. at 555.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 555–56.
238. AM. MED. ASS’N, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR GENDER-AFFIRMING
CARE OF TRANSGENDER PATIENTS 3 nn.15, 17–19 (2019), https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/2019-03/transgender-coverage-issue-brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HRW-FT35];
William V. Padula, Shiona Heru & Jonathan D. Campbell, Societal Implications of Health
Insurance Coverage for Medically Necessary Services in the U.S. Transgender Population: A
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 31 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 394, 398 (2015); Routh et al., supra
note 5, at 18 (“The costs of other medical procedures that state DOC are required to
provide (e.g., major surgery or continual hormone therapy) cost substantially more than
short-term psychotherapy.”).
239. Padula et al., supra note 238, at 395.
240. Id. at 398.
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attractive one.241 In addition, the American Medical Association adopted
the position that gender-affirming care is cost-effective relative to “costs
associated with untreated gender dysphoria.”242 Therefore, there is a
growing consensus that increasing accessibility to medically necessary
treatment actually mitigates costs by reducing the risks of suicidality and
autocastration and any accompanying costs.
The cost-saving argument has been employed to counter the cost concern in court. For example, in an amicus brief filed for Edmo v. Corizon,
Inc., the Williams Institute articulated this point, arguing that cost projections using conservative assumptions highlight that Corizon would actually incur negligible costs by providing this form of treatment—an
outcome “unlikely to affect future health care plan costs.”243 Significantly, the Williams Institute argued that the asserted cost concern fails to
account for the significant costs “incurred to treat the prisoner’s gender
dysphoria in the absence of surgery as a treatment option.”244 This is particularly evidenced in cases like Edmo, where the Idaho DOC incurred
costs associated with Edmo’s continued suicidality and autocastration attempts. Accordingly, the Williams Institute argued that to truly account
for cost, prison authorities should offer gender-affirming care to reduce
unnecessary, incidental costs associated with the denial of treatment.245
Ultimately, the cost-saving arguments supporting the denial of GCS
are unpersuasive. These arguments fail to adequately consider the research showing that the provision of gender-affirming care is actually
cost-effective in the long-term. Specifically, those arguing in favor of costsaving strategies discount the costs associated with ongoing treatment for
severe gender dysphoria and security-related monitoring costs. Beyond
this, cost-saving proponents, in effect, use cost as an absolute barrier to a
form of treatment that may be considered medically necessary. In this
regard, the cost factor serves to deny inmates what is considered adequate care itself in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
In short, the common counterarguments are unpersuasive. Although
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence limits inmate choice over treatment
and acknowledges cost constraints, neither articulated concern applies in
the context of gender-affirming care. As noted, inmates must satisfy the
SOC’s prerequisites to be diagnosed with gender dysphoria and to qualify
for the forms of treatment. Further, cost may only be used when deciding
between equally effective forms of treatment. Categorical prohibitions of
medically necessary, albeit disfavored, forms of treatment are not valid
under cost concerns.
241. Id. at 399.
242. AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 238, at 3.
243. Brief of Amicus Curiae Jody L. Herman in Support of Appellee Adree Edmo and
Urging Affirmance at 5–6, Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 1935019), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Amicus-Edmo-9th-CirApr-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF7R-WVHB].
244. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
245. Id. at 21–22.
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VII. CONCLUSION
“The degree of civilization in a society can be judged by entering
its prisons.”246
The primary issue underlying this Comment is neither one of policy nor
morals. Instead, it is a constitutional question regarding the scope of existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The answer is clear: transgender
inmates presenting gender dysphoria are entitled to gender-affirming
care, including gender confirmation surgery, under the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. Categorial prohibitions against the
provision of gender-affirming care run afoul of this constitutional
guarantee.
The Eighth Amendment places an affirmative duty on prison officials
to provide inmates with adequate medical care.247 For transgender inmates, however, this constitutional duty is often unmet. Authorities frequently cite administrative, cost, policy, and taxpayer concerns to skirt
the constitutional guarantee. The danger of denying care for the transgender community is clear and the risks are dire; the failure to treat gender dysphoria may result in depression, suicidality, autocastration, or
death.248
Denial of gender-affirming care obfuscates the call of the Eighth
Amendment itself. The Supreme Court has historically noted that the Bill
of Rights “withdraw[s] certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials
and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”249
Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment and its guarantee against cruel and
unusual punishment “may not be submitted to [a] vote,” subject to the
whims of politics.250 So too does the Eighth Amendment withdraw questions concerning the provision of gender-affirming care from the vicissitudes of political controversy and resolution by electoral victory.
Ultimately, the principle “underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”251 For this to mean anything, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment must derive its meaning
from the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”252 A failure by courts to apply this dynamic standard
would render the Constitution and its protections “little more than good
advice.”253 Consequently, the Constitution obligates the State “to care
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Shapiro ed. 2006) (quoting FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKI, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD (Constance
Garnett trans. 1948) (1862)).
247. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
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for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty,
care for himself.”254 Affording dignity to the incarcerated is central: “By
protecting . . . those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment
reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all
persons.”255
The Eighth Amendment applies equally to the transgender and cisgender populations. The transgender community—a minority status
within the U.S. population and the U.S. prison population—has been and
continues to be misunderstood. The Eighth Amendment does not permit
prison authorities to rely on misperceptions about the transgender community to deny access to necessary care. Nor does it empower the State
to deny medically necessary forms of treatment because it is politically
disfavored. Just as the Eighth Amendment guarantees cisgender inmates
access to adequate care, it guarantees transgender inmates access to adequate care.
This constitutional guarantee is particularly important for transgender
inmates exhibiting gender dysphoria. The denial of gender-affirming care
serves no penological purpose. It inflicts ongoing suffering with wellknown risks on a vulnerable population. At worst, with increased risk of
suicidality and autocastration, the denial of care may result in torture or
lingering death for the inmate—the evils of most immediate concern for
the drafters of the Eighth Amendment. At the same time, prohibitions of
gender-affirming care may increase the administrative and taxpayer costs
to treat the consequences of these ill-informed policies. These realities
run counter to the Eighth Amendment’s intended purpose. Ultimately,
through the Eighth Amendment, the Constitution valorizes the dignity of
transgender persons. In doing so, it ensures access to necessary genderaffirming care when the serious medical need—gender dysphoria—is
present.
The right to adequate medical care may be deep-rooted in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, but the Supreme Court cannot allow this
guarantee to lose its meaning. In Weems v. United States, the Supreme
Court noted that courts must not only consider what may have been, but
what may be.256 A failure to do so would render the Constitution “deficient in efficacy and power,” and the rights protected therein would be
“lost in reality.”257 Moving forward, courts must remain informed by the
existing consensus regarding the transgender community and valorize the
right to gender-affirming care enshrined in the Eighth Amendment.
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